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A COURT BETWEEN: 
Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in  
the British Columbia Court of Appeal
Douglas C .  Harris 1
 Mr. Sanders, we enjoyed your interesting argument.”2 With these final words the British Columbia Court of Appeal, in a brief oral judgment of 28 January 1977, dismissed the 
appeal of nine members of the Cowichan Tribes in R. v. Jack. The nine 
had been convicted at trial for fishing during the closed season, the 
latest altercation in almost a century of conflict over the fisheries on the 
Cowichan River.3 Their legal argument, constructed around the terms of 
British Columbia’s entry into Confederation and the history of fisheries 
regulation in the former colony, deserved serious judicial consideration 
from the three-justice bench, not platitude.4 However, in an era before 
the constitutional entrenchment of Aboriginal and treaty rights, and in a 
province that had long denied their existence, the claims re-emerged in 
the 1960s and 1970s to a sceptical Court of Appeal – a subject of interest 
but a novelty of uncertain legal consequence.
 Claims to Aboriginal and treaty rights all but disappeared from 
Canadian courts in the second quarter of the twentieth century. A 1927 
amendment to the Indian Act, repealed in 1951, prohibited the raising 
of funds to pursue land claims without leave from the Department 
 1 I thank ubc law student Keith Evans for his research assistance and Hamar Foster, Angus 
Gunn, Cole Harris, John McLaren, Wes Pue, Graeme Wynn, and an anonymous reviewer 
for their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this article.
 2 R. v. Jack, [1977] B.C.J. No. 123 (28 January 1977) at para. 24. The comment is from Bull J.A. It 
follows the oral judgment delivered for the court by Robertson J.A. 
 3 On the conflict over fisheries on the Cowichan River, see Douglas C. Harris, Fish, Law, and 
Colonialism: The Legal Capture of Salmon in British Columbia (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2001) chap. 3.
 4 The court ruled that its even more perfunctory decision in R. v. Point (1957), 22 W.W.R. 527, 
denying the accused member of the Musqueam Nation recourse to the terms of union as a 
defence against a charge for failing to file an income tax return, was binding. When R. v. 
Jack, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 294, [1979] 2 C.N.LR. 25, reached the Supreme Court of Canada, Justice 
Laskin and Justice Dickson, in concurring judgments, upheld the fisheries convictions but 
dismissed, in Justice Laskin’s words, the “narrow ground” of the bcca’s ruling.
“
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of Indian Affairs.5 The effect was to bar claims to Aboriginal rights, 
with the result that these rights were largely unknown to the judiciary 
in British Columbia when, in the 1960s, Aboriginal peoples and their 
legal counsel began to reassert them in the courtroom. The constitu-
tional entrenchment of Aboriginal and treaty rights in 1982 dramatically 
altered the legal landscape, drawing those rights into courtrooms where 
they had seldom been heard and elevating the role of the judiciary in 
defining the relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the Canadian 
state.6 Nowhere is this more true than in British Columbia, a province 
largely devoid of treaties and where the issue of Aboriginal title remains 
unresolved.
 This article reviews the decisions of the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal (bcca) in the area of Aboriginal and treaty rights and reflects 
on the court’s role in defining the content of those rights. It turns first 
to the two most important of the early cases to work their way through 
the court – R. v. White and Bob7 and Calder v. British Columbia8 – and 
to several other cases that reveal a court confident in its assumption that 
Aboriginal rights had little bearing on the province. The decisions of 
the court in the 1970s reflected and consolidated the status quo, at least 
as regards Aboriginal rights and title. This would change in a series of 
decisions from the court in the short decade following 1982, when it 
began to infuse those rights with substantial legal effect. MacMillan 
Bloedel Ltd. v. Mullin (the Meares Island case)9 and R. v. Sparrow,10 
in particular, mark the definitive end of an era when the claims of 
Aboriginal peoples might give rise to a sense of moral obligation but no 
legal consequence.
 In the early 1990s a cluster of cases, including R. v. Van der Peet11 and 
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,12 worked their way through the bcca 
 5 An Act to Amend the Indian Act, S.C. 1927, c. 32.
 6 Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11: “The 
existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized 
and affirmed.”
 7 R. v. White and Bob (1964), 50 D.L.R. (2d) 613, 52 W.W.R. 193 (B.C.C.A.) [White and Bob 
(B.C.C.A.) cited to D.L.R.].
 8 Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney General) (1970), 13 D.L.R. (3d) 64, 74 W.W.R. 481 
(B.C.C.A.) [Calder (B.C.C.A.) cited to D.L.R.].
 9 MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Mullin, [1985] 3 W.W.R. 577, [1985] 2 C.N.L.R. 55 (B.C.C.A) [Mac-
Millan Bloedel (B.C.C.A.) cited to W.W.R.].
 10 R. v. Sparrow, [1987] 2 W.W.R. 577, [1987] 1 C.N.L.R. 145, (B.C.C.A.) [Sparrow (B.C.C.A.) 
cited to W.W.R.].
 11 R. v. Van der Peet, [1993] 5 W.W.R. 459, [1993] 4 C.N.L.R. 221 (B.C.C.A.) [Van der Peet 
(B.C.C.A.) cited to W.W.R.].
 12 R. v. Delgamuukw, [1993] 5 W.W.R. 470, [1993] 5 C.N.L.R. 1 (B.C.C.A.) [Delgamuukw 
(B.C.C.A.) cited to W.W.R.].
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to the Supreme Court of Canada (scc). These cases form cornerstones in 
Aboriginal rights jurisprudence, but a divided bcca had a muted role in 
this foundation building. In recent years, rights and title cases have been 
less to the fore, but the bcca has reframed the practice of Aboriginal 
rights litigation through a diverse set of decisions on the relationship 
between Aboriginal title and the province’s title registration system, 
the obligations on the parties to consult, the circumstances in which 
the courts are prepared to adjudicate a land claim, and the funding of 
Aboriginal rights litigation. Ascribing an overarching approach in these 
most recent cases to what has become an increasingly large and diverse 
appellate bench is a difficult undertaking, but it is apparent that the 
court is more comfortable defining the parameters of a process than in 
determining the content of Aboriginal rights and title.
 There are many ways to explore the growing prominence of Aboriginal 
and treaty rights in British Columbia. An analysis of the decisions of a 
single court, even the province’s highest court, can provide only the most 
partial of explanations. Provincial courts of appeal are institutionally 
confined, positioned between the trial courts that produce the record 
of the case and, in the area of Aboriginal and treaty rights, an engaged 
scc. Moreover, changes within the domestic legal system are only part 
of a larger set of forces, the result of which is a much more enhanced 
recognition of Aboriginal and treaty rights than existed a generation 
ago. Nonetheless, in the years following the constitutional entrenchment 
of Aboriginal and treaty rights in 1982, the bcca became one of the 
prominent voices in their articulation. This article divulges that voice, 
its early reticence, and the diverse strands within it, through an analysis 
of the court’s decisions. 
PRE-SECTION 35 ABORIGINAL AND  
TREATY RIGHTS 
James Douglas, the chief factor of the Hudson’s Bay Company (hbc) at 
Fort Victoria, concluded a set of fourteen agreements with Aboriginal 
peoples on Vancouver Island between 1850 and 1854. The written text 
of each of the agreements was in the form of a land transfer, not a 
formal treaty, and, a century after their making, these agreements were 
unfamiliar parts of the legal or political landscape in British Columbia, 
at least beyond the Aboriginal communities that were parties to them. 
Thomas Berger, legal counsel for the Snuneymuxw (Nanaimo) in 
R. v. White and Bob, the first treaty rights case to reach the bcca, recounts 
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his surprise when Snuneymuxw elders told him that their people had 
a treaty right to hunt.13 According to the text of the agreements, the 
Snuneymuxw retained the “liberty to hunt over unoccupied land and to 
carry on their fisheries as formerly.”14 However, to be effective as a defence 
against charges of hunting out of season and without a licence, Berger 
and the Snuneymuxw had to convince the bcca that the 1854 agreement 
with James Douglas was a treaty. They retained the provincial archivist, 
Willard Ireland, and Wilson Duff, the curator of anthropology at the 
provincial museum in Victoria, as expert historian and anthropologist, 
respectively.15 Berger also turned to a more distant set of legal documents, 
including the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the 1823 decision of Justice 
Marshall of the United States Supreme Court in Johnson v. McIntosh.16 
These and other sources had been marshalled in what Hamar Foster has 
described as the first campaign for Indian title, 1908-28, but a generation 
had passed since they had been aired in British Columbia, and they had 
never been presented to the bcca.17 Berger was leading the court into 
legal terrain it had never before traversed.
 The court split. Justices Sheppard and Lord concluded that the 
agreements were merely land transfer agreements, Justices Davey and 
Norris, in separate reasons, that the agreements were treaties. Justice 
Sullivan concurred with Justice Davey. By a 3:2 margin the agreements 
were treaties. In his reasons, Justice Norris set out a framework for the 
interpretation of historic treaties between Aboriginal peoples and the 
Canadian state that the scc would adopt in later cases: 
 13 Thomas Berger, One Man’s Justice: A Life in the Law (Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 2002) 
88. On the changing nature and role of legal counsel in litigating Aboriginal and treaty rights 
cases, see Douglas Sanders “Lawyers and Indians,” 17 January 2001 (unpublished). 
 14 The text of the Douglas treaties is reproduced in Papers Connected with the Indian Land 
Question, 1850-1875, 1877 (Victoria: Queen’s Printers, 1987) 5-11. There is no text of the agreement 
with the Snuneymuxw but, instead, a notation after the first thirteen agreements indicating 
that the “Saalquun Tribe – Nanaimo” had made “a similar conveyance.”
 15 See Wilson Duff, “The Fort Victoria Treaties,” BC Studies 3 (1969): 3-57.
 16 Johnson v. McIntosh, (1823) 21 US (8 Wheat) 543.
 17 Hamar Foster, “We Are Not O’Meara’s Children: Law, Lawyers, and the First Campaign for 
Aboriginal Title in British Columbia, 1908-28,” in Foster, Heather Raven and Jeremy Webber, 
eds., Let Right Be Done: Aboriginal Title, the Calder Case, and the Future of Indigenous Rights 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 61-84.
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The question is, in my respectful opinion, to be resolved not by the 
application of rigid rules of construction without regard to the circum-
stances existing when the document was completed nor by the tests 
of modern day draftsmanship. In determining what the intention of 
parliament was at the time of enactment of sec. 87 of the Indian Act, 
parliament is to be taken to have had in mind the common under-
standing of the parties to the document at the time it was executed. In 
the section “treaty” is not a word of art and, in my respectful opinion, 
it embraces all such engagements made by persons in authority as may 
be brought within the term “the word of the white man,” the sanctity 
of which was, at the time of British exploration and settlement, the 
most important means of obtaining the goodwill and cooperation of the 
native tribes and ensuring that the colonists would be protected from 
death and destruction. On such assurance the Indians relied.18
 Treaty interpretation was to be based on an attempt to discern 
“common understanding,” not the Crown’s unilateral construction of 
meaning and “not by the application of rigid rules of construction without 
regard to the circumstances.” Moreover, Justice Norris continued, even 
if the agreements were not treaties, the Snuneymuxw rights to hunt and 
fish “still exist.”19 As a result, “this is not a case merely of making the 
law applicable to native Indians as well as to white persons so that there 
may be equality of treatment under the law, but of depriving Indians 
of rights vested in them from time immemorial, which white persons 
have not had, viz., the right to hunt out of season on unoccupied land for 
food for themselves and their families.”20 In short, the rights preceded 
the treaty, had been confirmed by it and by the Royal Proclamation, and 
had not been extinguished. Justice Norris doubted that the colony or the 
province could extinguish those rights; that power lay with the imperial 
government and, after Confederation, with the federal government.21 In 
sum, his was an exceedingly powerful statement about the continuing 
legal salience of Aboriginal rights and title, particularly so from a judge 
near the end of a prominent career in the province’s business community 
and legal establishment.22 However, in 1964 Justice Norris stood alone 
in this analysis. The scc would uphold the decision of the bcca in a 
 18 White and Bob (B.C.C.A.) at 648-49. The scc cited the first two sentences of this passage in 
R. v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025 at para. 16, [1990] 3 C.N.L.R. 127. See also para. 44.
 19 Ibid. at 647.
 20 Ibid. at 648.
 21 Ibid. at 656-57. 
 22 See G.S. Cumming, Q.C., “Nos Disparus: The Honourable Thomas Grantham Norris, M.C., 
Q.C.,” The Advocate 35 (1977): 69-70.
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brief oral judgment but only on the ground that the agreements were 
treaties.23 It would withhold comment on the nature of Aboriginal title 
until Calder.
 The issue of Aboriginal title was a long time in coming directly 
before Canadian courts. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
had considered and defined its content as a “personal and usufructuary 
right, dependent on the good will of the Sovereign” in the late nine-
teenth century case of St. Catharine’s Milling & Lumber Co.24 However, 
that case revolved around a jurisdictional dispute between the federal 
government and Ontario, not a claim of Aboriginal title. The Nisga’a 
would be the first to bring an Aboriginal title claim when, in 1967, they 
turned to the courts for a declaration that their Aboriginal title had not 
been extinguished. They did not ask for a definition of that title or a 
determination of its geographic scope but merely a declaration that their 
title had not been extinguished. Such a declaration, they believed, would 
then form the basis for treaty negotiations with Canada and the province. 
Thomas Berger would argue the Nisga’a case from trial, through the 
bcca, to the scc, and it was likely that his success in White and Bob was 
the catalyst that brought the Nisga’a to court. However, as early as 1913 
the Nisga’a had formulated the basis of their claim to Aboriginal title 
in a petition that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council declined 
to entertain.25
 The trial court heard expert archival and anthropological evidence 
on the nature of Nisga’a use, ownership, and territorial control of their 
lands, and on the history of Nisga’a interaction with government offi-
cials.26 The court also heard the testimony of five Nisga’a chiefs, including 
Nisga’a Tribal Council president Frank Calder. They testified as to the 
structure of Nisga’a society, Nisga’a relations with their neighbours, the 
extent of Nisga’a territory, and to the fact that the Nisga’a had never sur-
rendered their Aboriginal title to that territory.27 Douglas McK Brown, 
 23 R. v. White and Bob, [1965] S.C.R. vi, 52 D.L.R. (2d) 481.
 24 St. Catharine’s Milling & Lumber Co. v. R. (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46 at 54.
 25 The petition is reproduced in Foster et al., Let Right Be Done, Appendix B, 241-45. See also 
Foster, “We Are Not O’Meara’s Children.”
 26 Berger turned again to Willard Ireland and Wilson Duff. See Wilson Duff, The Indian History 
of British Columbia, vol. 1: The Impact of the White Man (Victoria: Royal British Columbia 
Museum, 1969), written between his testimony in White and Bob and Calder.
 27 The other chiefs to testify were James Gosnell of New Aiyansh, Maurice Nyce of Canyon 
City, W.D. McKay of Greenville, and Anthony Robinson of Kincolith. For extensive excerpts 
of the testimony, see the judgment of Hall J. in the scc. See also Berger, One Man’s Justice, 
115-19.
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counsel for the province, did not challenge this evidence.28 He based 
the province’s defence on two legal propositions: (1) that Aboriginal 
title never existed in British Columbia but (2) that if it had, it had been 
extinguished. It was a straightforward and honest legal statement of what 
had long been provincial policy. The considerable challenge for Berger 
and the Nisga’a was to demonstrate that the province was wrong in law, 
a challenge compounded by the fact that such a finding would disrupt 
deeply seated assumptions within the province about the inviolability 
of the Crown’s title.
 The trial judge ruled that, whatever the legal status of Aboriginal title 
(he declined to make a determination), it had been extinguished. The 
bcca went further: Aboriginal title did not exist. Chief Justice Davey 
wrote that the Nisga’a “must establish that by prerogative or legislative 
act, or by a course of dealing by the Crown from which a prerogative 
act can be inferred, the Crown ensured to the Nishga Nation aboriginal 
rights in the lands in question.”29 In short, Aboriginal title was a legal 
interest only if the colonial state recognized it as such. Without a treaty 
to establish the Crown’s recognition, the Nisga’a turned to the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763, but Justices Tysoe and Maclean ruled that the im-
perial edict did not apply to British Columbia. Moreover, if Aboriginal 
title did exist then the various colonial land ordinances and acts had 
effectively, albeit implicitly, extinguished it. Justice Tysoe overcame the 
lack of any express extinguishment of Aboriginal title in the legislative 
record with the weight of statutes and ordinances – thirteen in all between 
the creation of the mainland colony in 1858 and British Columbia’s entry 
into Confederation in 1871 – in which the Crown asserted its title and 
outlined the terms under which it would distribute interests in land.30 
All three justices in Calder ignored the reasons of Justice Norris in White 
and Bob, which to that point was the fullest examination of the status 
of Aboriginal title. Instead, in language similar to the findings of the 
trial court in the next Aboriginal title case, Delgamuukw, Chief Justice 
Davey found that “they [the Nisga’a] were undoubtedly at the time of 
settlement a very primitive people with few of the institutions of civilized 
society, and none at all of our notions of private property.”31 The judgment 
 28 See “Frank Calder and Thomas Berger: A Conversation,” in Foster et al. eds., Let Right Be 
Done, 43-44.
 29 Calder (B.C.C.A.) at 67.
 30 Ibid. at 87-94.
 31 Ibid. at 66. In the scc, [1973] S.C.R. 313, 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145, Hall J. would challenge Davey 
C.J.B.C. directly on this point (p. 347), reproducing pages of testimony and evidence from 
the trial to find, at page 375, that “the Nishgas in fact are and were from time immemorial a 
distinctive cultural entity with concepts of ownership indigenous to their culture and capable 
of articulation under the common law.”
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reflected provincial policy and broadly accepted public perceptions. 
It has been ignored by subsequent courts but not by the province, which 
claimed for more than another decade that the decision of the bcca on 
Aboriginal title was binding, notwithstanding the scc decision that 
was to follow.
 The decision of the scc in Calder was either an exquisite piece of 
judicial balancing or equivocation. The court split three, three, and one: 
three that Aboriginal title existed but had been extinguished; three that 
it existed and had not been extinguished; and one that the Nisga’a had 
not secured the requisite permission from the province to bring a lawsuit 
against the province. The three who found that Aboriginal title had been 
extinguished concurred with the one who ruled on the procedural short-
coming and thus, in a four-to-three ruling, the scc denied the Nisga’a 
appeal. However, six justices repudiated the lower court’s finding that 
Aboriginal title did not exist, and three of those held that Aboriginal 
title remained intact as a legal interest. This outcome prodded the federal 
government to transform its Indian policy, establish a comprehensive 
Indian land claims process, and enter treaty negotiations. In British 
Columbia the provincial government maintained that, because the scc 
had ruled against the Nisga’a on a technical ground, the judgment of 
the bcca on Aboriginal title – that Aboriginal title did not exist, or, 
that if it did, it had been extinguished – properly reflected the state of 
the law.
 The decisions of the bcca before the constitutional entrenchment of 
Aboriginal and treaty rights reveal much about the nature of British 
Columbia’s settler society and its relations with Aboriginal peoples. In 
varying degrees, they reflect the attempts of that society to justify in 
law its position of superiority and power in a colonial setting, while at 
the same time beginning to come to terms with the consequences of the 
colonial encounter and the processes of reconciliation. The judgments 
of Justice Norris and, to a lesser extent, of Justice Davey in White and 
Bob speak most clearly to the effort of reconciliation. Conversely, the 
decisions of the court in Calder and then in Jack reflect the long and much 
more broadly held perception that the colony and then the province of 
British Columbia had managed its Aboriginal peoples full well without 
the unhelpful intrusion of legal doctrines such as Aboriginal title and 
rights, concepts that provincial officials believed were of dubious legal 
pedigree and uncertain effect. Where the cases went to the scc, as many 
of them did, the latter upheld the decisions of the bcca, dismissing the 
Crown’s appeal in White and Bob and that of the Aboriginal appellants in 
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the other cases. However, this tally of confirmations is misleading, par-
ticularly in Calder but also in Jack, where the scc justices were sketching 
out a fundamentally different legal framework for relations between 
Aboriginal peoples and the Canadian state, while the bcca decisions 
remained embedded in and sustained a set of legal and more broadly 
cultural assumptions of Western superiority and entitlement.32
ABORIGINAL AND TREATY RIGHTS  
FOLLOWING s. 35
The lodging of Aboriginal and treaty rights within the Canadian 
Constitution in 1982 presaged an enormous transformation in Canadian 
law. Once viewed with scepticism, these rights now had constitutional 
purchase, and four decisions from the bcca in the mid-late 1980s reveal 
the effects of this elevated status. The first and last of these cases, R. v. 
Bartleman33 and Tsawout Indian Band v. Saanichton Marina Ltd.,34 dealt, 
respectively, with the hunting and fishing provisions in the Douglas 
treaties. Two other cases decided within a year of each other, the Meares 
Island case and Sparrow, illustrate even more clearly the early impact of 
the constitutional entrenchment of Aboriginal rights and title.
 In 1977, conservation officers charged Joseph Bartleman, a member of 
the Tsartlip First Nation, for hunting deer with a prohibited cartridge. 
Seven years later he appeared before the bcca pleading a treaty rights 
defence based on the hunting provision in the Douglas treaties. After 
White and Bob, there was no doubt that the 1852 agreement between 
the Tsartlip and the hbc was a valid treaty. In this case Bartleman 
had been hunting on private land outside the boundaries of the lands 
described in the treaty. Did the treaty right to “hunt over unoccupied 
land” extend beyond the described boundaries to include the traditional 
hunting territory of the Tsartlip, and might “unoccupied land” include 
private land? A unanimous bcca overturned the conviction of the trial 
court;35 the treaty right to hunt extended throughout the traditional 
hunting territory of the Tsartlip, and the private lands in question were 
“unoccupied lands” within the meaning of the treaty. Justice Lambert, 
 32 See also the two decisions that the BCCA released on 28 February 1975: R. v. Derriksan, [1975] 
4 W.W.R. 761, 9 C.N.L.C. 507 (B.C.C.A.); and R. v. Kruger, [1975] 5 W.W.R. 167, 9 C.N.L.C. 
620 (B.C.C.A.). 
 33 R. v. Bartleman (1984), 12 D.L.R. (4th) 73, [1984] 3 C.N.L.R. 114 [Bartleman (B.C.C.A.) cited 
to D.L.R.]. 
 34 Saanichton Marina Ltd. v. Claxton, [1989] 5 W.W.R. 82, [1989] 3 C.N.L.R. 46 (B.C.C.A.) 
[Saanichton Marina (B.C.C.A.) cited to W.W.R.].
 35 R. v. Bartleman, [1981] 1 C.N.L.R. 83 (B.C. Co. Ct.).
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who wrote the central judgment, drew on emerging principles of treaty 
interpretation that required not only a liberal interpretation of treaty 
terms in favour of the Tsartlip but also that the treaties be interpreted 
as they would have been understood by them.36 The decision provoked 
controversy, although not so much for the conclusion or for the principles 
of treaty interpretation that it reinforced as for Justice Lambert’s stepping 
beyond the accustomed judicial role by collecting and reviewing historical 
material that neither party had introduced in evidence.37 In a concurring 
judgment that appeared designed to assuage concern, Justice Esson (with 
Justice Carrothers) indicated that they agreed with Justice Lambert’s 
interpretation of the treaty but had reached this conclusion without seeing 
or relying on any of the material that had not been introduced at trial.
 The bcca signalled in Bartleman that it would not construe Aboriginal 
treaties in narrow, technical terms but, rather, that it would infuse the 
slight text of the Douglas treaties with substantial meaning. However, 
the court also ruled that treaty rights had their limits, particularly 
where it perceived that public safety was an issue. R. v. Napoleon arose 
when Saulteaux hunters, parties to Treaty 8, shot a deer within a “No 
Shooting” zone adjacent to a public highway.38 The hunters argued that 
the regulations were in conflict with the hunting rights in Treaty 8 and, 
therefore, did not apply to them. Justice Taggart, writing for the court, 
disagreed: the object of the regulations was “the protection of the public 
from unsafe shooting” and to set “standards of safety expected of all 
members of the public.”39 The bcca reiterated this position nearly two 
decades later in the night hunting case of R. v. Morris and Olsen.40 Justices 
Thackray and Huddart agreed with the trial judge that hunting at night 
was “inherently dangerous,” and that the night hunting prohibition in the 
Wildlife Act did not infringe or unjustifiably infringe the Douglas treaty 
right to hunt.41 Justice Lambert, in dissent, held otherwise: “the true 
meaning of the treaty is that safety is a matter for control by the Indian 
peoples under their own laws, customs, traditions, and practices and not 
by the unilateral non-consultative enactment of the largely non-Indian 
 36 Bartleman (B.C.C.A.) at 86-91.
 37 See M.H. Ogilvie, “Case Notes: R. v. Bartleman,” Canadian Bar Review 64 (1986): 183-205, 
and the rejoinder, P.B. Carter, “Do Courts Decide According to the Evidence?” UBC Law 
Review 22 (1988): 351-67.
 38 R. v. Napoleon, [1985] 6 W.W.R. 302, [1986] 1 C.N.L.R. 86 (B.C.C.A.) [cited to W.W.R.]. 
 39 Ibid. at 318.
 40 R. v. Morris and Olsen, 2004 bcca 121. See also R. v. Seward (1999), 171 D.L.R. (4th) 524, [1999] 
3 C.N.L.R. 299.
 41 Ibid. paras. 173-74, 212.
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people.”42 A majority of the scc would agree with Justice Lambert, at 
least in so far as the general prohibition against night hunting was an 
overly broad restriction of the treaty right to hunt.43
 In the 1980s, the bcca would also interpret the right to “fisheries as 
formerly” in the Douglas treaties as providing substantial protection 
for traditional fishing territories. In Tsawout Indian Band v. Saanichton 
Marina Ltd. the Tsawout turned to the courts to challenge a proposed 
marina in Saanichton Bay that, if built, would occupy the fishing ground 
in front of their village site and Indian reserve and would infringe their 
treaty right. In a move that revealed the continuing opposition within the 
province to the idea that the Douglas treaties might contain enforceable 
rights, the Crown and company “pleaded emphatically” at trial that 
the Douglas treaties, if indeed they were treaties, were not binding on 
the Crown.44 It was an argument that Hamar Foster has described as 
“not merely tenuous, but unworthy” of the Crown,45 and the trial judge 
dismissed it in a preliminary motion.46 In the alternative, the Crown 
argued that the “fisheries as formerly” provision secured nothing more 
than the right of the Tsawout and other signatory tribes to participate in 
the fisheries on the same terms as the public. The trial judge dismissed 
this argument as well and ordered a stop to the marina. The bcca agreed. 
Justice Hinkson, writing for a court that included Justices Lambert and 
Locke, concluded that, while the “fisheries as formerly” provision “does 
not amount to a proprietary interest in the sea bed nor a contractual right 
to a fishing ground[,] it does protect the Indians against infringement 
of their right to carry on the fishery, as they have done for centuries, in 
the shelter of Saanichton Bay.”47 The effect of the treaty was “to afford 
to the Indians an independent source of protection of their right to carry 
on their fisheries as formerly.”48 
 British Columbia’s highest court was now telling the province, 
through Bartleman and Saanichton Marina, that the hunting and fishing 
provisions in the Douglas treaties conferred enforceable rights that did 
more than simply guarantee Native peoples the right to participate 
on the same terms as the non-Native public. The court’s rejection of 
 42 Ibid. para. 62.
 43 R. v. Morris and Olsen, 2006 scc 59.
 44 Saanichton Marina Ltd. v. Claxton, [1988] 1 W.W.R. 540 at 547-48, [1987] 4 C.N.L.R. 48 [Saan-
ichton Marina (B.C.S.C.) cited to W.W.R.].
 45 Hamar Foster, “The Saanichton Bay Marina Case: Imperial Law, Colonial History and 
Competing Theories of Aboriginal Title,” UBC Law Review 23 (1989): 629-50 at 640.
 46 Saanichton Marina (B.C.S.C.) Schedule 2 at 551-54.
 47 Saanichton Marina (B.C.C.A.) at 93.
 48 Ibid. at 94.
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provincial policy was even more striking in its decisions respecting 
Aboriginal rights and title. 
 In Calder the scc had announced that Aboriginal title was an interest 
of legal consequence. Whether it had been extinguished in British 
Columbia remained to be resolved, as did the details of its content. 
Initial answers began to appear in the 1980s, particularly in the bcca’s 
decision regarding the Meares Island case. This case emerged from a 
high-profile conflict between a logging company and the province on 
the one hand, and environmentalists and Native peoples on the other, 
over the logging of Meares Island. MacMillan Bloedel, to which the 
province had granted timber rights on the island, planned to begin 
logging; environmentalists sought to preserve the old-growth forest on 
the island; and the Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council (ntc) claimed the 
island as an integral part of its traditional territory to which the Nuu-
chah-nulth held Aboriginal title. The case came before the courts in the 
form of requests for injunctions, one from MacMillan Bloedel to stop 
the protestors from blocking its access to the island, another from the 
Clayoquot and Ahousaht (members of the ntc) to stop the company 
from logging pending the resolution of the claim to Aboriginal title.
 The chambers judge who heard the injunction requests held that 
the claim of the Clayoquot and Ahousaht to Aboriginal title had no 
prospect of success at trial and, further, that the claim had been too long 
in coming. Moreover, if granted, the injunction would have “potentially 
disastrous consequences” for the provincial economy, given the extent of 
unresolved claims to Aboriginal title and the possibility that the grant 
of an injunction in this case would set a precedent that would spread 
across the province.49 In a split decision, the bcca disagreed. All the 
justices found that the claim to Aboriginal title presented a fair question 
or a serious issue to be tried. Calder was not, as the chambers judge had 
held, “a complete answer to the assertion of aboriginal title.”50 Justice 
Macfarlane, who concurred with Justices Seaton and Lambert in the 
majority, suggested instead that “using the Calder case as a standard [for 
determining the continued existence of Aboriginal title] the least that 
can be said is that there is an even chance of success at trial.”51 Moreover, 
the bcca dismissed the notion of undue delay. Justice Seaton put it this 
way: “The Indians have pressed their land claims in various ways for 
generations. The claims have not been dealt with and found invalid. 
 49 MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Mullin, [1985] 2 W.W.R. 722 at 749, [1985] 2 C.N.L.R. 26, (B.C.S.C.) 
[cited to W.W.R.].
 50 Ibid. at 739.
 51 MacMillan Bloedel (B.C.C.A.) at 605.
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They have not been dealt with at all. Meanwhile, the logger continues 
his steady march and the Indians see themselves retreating into a smaller 
and smaller area.”52
 Unified on the question of a serious issue to be tried, the bcca divided 
on which of the parties would bear the larger burden if the injunction 
were granted or denied. Justice Craig in dissent held that to permit the 
logging would not cause “irreparable damage” to the Nuu-chah-nulth; if 
they were eventually able to establish Aboriginal title over all or some part 
of the island, compensation for damages would be a sufficient remedy.53 
Justice Macdonald, also in dissent, echoed the concern of the chambers 
judge that to grant the injunction would have “potentially disastrous 
consequences” and would wreak “havoc” on the provincial economy.54 
The dispute over logging on Meares Island, he suggested, was not unique, 
and he was worried about the precedent it would set and the advantage 
it would give Native peoples in future negotiations.55
 Justice Seaton disagreed. Any damage to MacMillan Bloedel as 
a result of an order to stop logging on Meares Island was minimal, 
particularly when compared to the Nuu-chah-nulth loss if the logging 
were to proceed and they were later able to establish Aboriginal title:
Meares Island is of importance to MacMillan Bloedel, but it cannot be 
said that denying or postponing its right would cause irreparable harm. 
If an injunction prevents MacMillan Bloedel from logging pending 
the trial and it is decided that MacMillan Bloedel has the right to log, 
the timber will still be there.
The position of the Indians is quite different. It appears that the area to 
be logged will be wholly logged. The forest that the Indians know and 
use will be permanently destroyed. The tree from which the bark was 
partially stripped in 1642 may be cut down, middens may be destroyed, 
fish traps damaged and canoe runs despoiled. Finally, the island’s 
symbolic value will be gone. The subject matter of the trial will have 
been destroyed before the rights are decided.56 
 52 Ibid. at 589.
 53 Ibid. at 596.
 54 Ibid. at 599.
 55 Ibid. at 603-4.
 56 Ibid. at 588.
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Justices Lambert and Macfarlane concurred, and the bcca ordered 
MacMillan Bloedel to stop logging pending the outcome of the Nuu-
chah-nulth claim to Aboriginal title. It was an enormously important 
decision that put the province on notice that resource extraction and 
other activity that interfered with or had the potential to infringe Ab-
original title, even where that title was claimed but not yet established 
or confirmed, would be subject to new limits.57 The bcca would return 
to these issues twenty years later in Haida Nation v. British Columbia 
(Minister of Forests).58
 The decision of the bcca in R. v. Sparrow is hardly remembered. Such 
is the fate of a decision that sits in the shadow of the scc decision that 
established the basic framework for the interpretation of Aboriginal 
rights. However, the 1986 decision of a unanimous court revealed the 
extraordinary distance that the bcca had travelled over the emerging 
terrain of Aboriginal rights in the decade since its decision in Jack.
 In the early 1980s, in an effort to halt what it perceived to be the 
illegal sale of salmon caught under a food-fishing licence, the federal 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans imposed fishing net-length 
restrictions, conducted a “sting” operation in which an undercover 
officer posed as a fish buyer, and eventually raided the Musqueam 
Indian Reserve seizing vehicles. Charges followed but were eventually 
dismissed. The dispute festered, and in 1984 the federal department laid 
charges against Ron Sparrow for fishing with a net that was too long. 
The Musqueam raised an Aboriginal rights defence: their fishery had 
priority subject only to valid conservation requirements. The trial judge 
convicted Sparrow. In his estimation, the bcca decision in Calder was 
binding, and therefore the Musqueam had no Aboriginal right to fish 
or, if they did have a right, it had been extinguished by the Fisheries Act 
and regulations. On appeal, the County Court judge concurred and held, 
further, that s. 35 could not revive a right that had been extinguished 
by regulation.
 A unanimous bcca led by Chief Justice Nemetz disagreed. As a first 
order of business, it buried the notion that its decision in Calder remained 
a binding statement on the state of Aboriginal rights and title in British 
Columbia.59 The Musqueam had fished on the Fraser River since time 
immemorial, and this gave rise to an Aboriginal right to fish.60 Moreover, 
 57 The scc refused leave to appeal. See MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Mullin, [1985] 5 W.W.R. lxiv.
 58 Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2002 bcca 147.
 59 Sparrow (B.C.C.A.) at 592-96.
 60 Ibid. at 596.
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“the ‘extinguishment by regulation’ proposition has no merit.”61 Turning 
to s. 35, the court held that the Aboriginal right to fish was now “entitled 
to constitutional protection.”62 The result was that “the Indian food 
fishery is given priority over the interests of other user groups” and that 
the right “cannot be extinguished.”63 Thus, while the government could 
restrict the Indian food fishery, it could only do so in a manner that “can 
be reasonably justified as being necessary for the proper management 
and conservation of the resource or in the public interest.”64 In this 
case, the Crown had not discharged its burden of establishing that the 
net-length restriction was necessary as a conservation measure and an 
appropriate restriction on a constitutionally protected right. Finally, the 
court defined the category of “food fishing” broadly: “‘food purposes’ 
should not be confined to subsistence. In particular, this is so because 
the Musqueam tradition and culture involves a consumption of salmon 
on ceremonial occasions and a broader use of fish than mere day to day 
domestic consumption.”65 The bcca set aside the conviction and ordered 
a new trial. 
 The bcca ruling in Sparrow was a remarkable decision from a unanimous 
court that, only a few years earlier, had thoroughly dismissed the idea 
of Aboriginal rights and title. In 1990, the scc upheld the result and the 
basic framework of analysis adopted in the bcca; the s. 35 protection for 
Aboriginal and treaty rights would not be reduced to a constitutional 
afterthought. The Supreme Court also imposed stricter limits on the 
Crown’s capacity to infringe a constitutional right. Conservation was a 
valid objective that might justify infringing the right, and there might 
be other valid objectives, such as the prevention of harm, but limiting 
the right in the public interest, as the bcca had proposed, was “so vague 
as to provide no meaningful guidance and so broad as to be unworkable 
as a test for the justification of a limitation on constitutional rights.”66 
Apart from this pointed correction, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Sparrow was a strong affirmation of the now largely forgotten decision 
of the bcca.
 61 Ibid. at 597.
 62 Ibid. at 599.
 63 Ibid. at 608.
 64 Ibid. at 609.
 65 Ibid. at 608.
 66 R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 at 1113, [1990] 3 C.N.L.R. 160.
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ABORIGINAL RIGHTS AND TITLE  
FOLLOWING SPARROW
In Sparrow and the Meares Island case, Aboriginal rights and title 
were as much a part of the legal terrain of British Columbia as trees 
and salmon were of its land and rivers. However, the detail of that 
terrain remained undefined. The single greatest effort of any Canadian 
court to describe that terrain came on 25 June 1993, when a five-panel 
bench of the bcca released seven decisions regarding Aboriginal rights 
to hunt and fish,67 as well as its decision in the Aboriginal title case of 
Delgamuukw. Most of the cases turned, first, on whether the Aboriginal 
defendants could establish an Aboriginal right and, then, on whether 
the Crown could justify its infringement of that right.68 All but the two 
hunting rights cases would rise to the scc, and several – Van der Peet, 
Gladstone, and Delgamuukw – would become central to the emerging 
interpretation of s. 35. The effort of the bcca was monumental, but its 
contributions in these seven cases to that interpretation were modest, a 
function, in part, of preceding the scc in the cases that it would use to 
define its approach to Aboriginal rights and title. However, it was also 
a function of the fact that, unlike Sparrow where the court had spoken 
with a single voice, in 1993 the bcca spoke with many and with little 
unanimity. Nonetheless, a few echoes from the twenty-four judgments 
of the five justices over the eight cases continue to reverberate in the 
growing body of case law on Aboriginal and treaty rights. A summary 
of the decisions appears in Table 1.
 The two hunting rights cases – Alphonse and Dick – involved Ab-
original rights defences to charges under the provincial Wildlife Act, in 
Alphonse for hunting out of season, in Dick for hunting without a permit. 
Justice Macfarlane wrote for the majority in both cases, with Justice 
Lambert writing separate, concurring reasons. Using the interpretative 
framework established in Sparrow, the bcca acquitted the defendants 
on the grounds that they were exercising an Aboriginal right to hunt, 
that the Wildlife Act infringed that right, and that the government had 
 67 R. v. Dick, [1993] 5 W.W.R. 446, [1993] 4 C.N.L.R. 63 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Alphonse, [1993] 5 
W.W.R. 401, [1993] 4 C.N.L.R. 19 (B.C.C.A.); Van der Peet (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Gladstone, [1993] 
5 W.W.R. 517, [1993] 4 C.N.L.R. 75 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. N.T.C. Smokehouse, [1993] 5 W.W.R. 542, 
[1993] 4 C.N.L.R. 158 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Nikal, [1993] 5 W.W.R. 629, [1993] 4 C.N.L.R. 117 
(B.C.C.A.); R. v. Lewis, [1993] 5 W.W.R. 608, [1993] 4 C.N.L.R. 98 (B.C.C.A.).
 68 Aboriginal rights were an issue in every case except R. v. Lewis, which turned on the con-
nection between the allotment of Indian reserves and the fisheries, something that was also 
an issue in N.T.C. Smokehouse and Nikal. For an account of the connections between Indian 
reserves and the fisheries, see Douglas C. Harris, Landing Native Fisheries: Indian Reserves 
and Rights to Fish in British Columbia, 1849-1925 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008).
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Table 1 
British Columbia Court of Appeal Decisions by Justice in the Aboriginal Rights and Title  
Cases Released 25 June 1993. (Bold indicates that the justice authored a decision in the case.)















































































































































































 i In Dick and Alphonse Lambert J.A. held that the regulations under the provincial Wildlife Act did 
not apply to the defendants in the exercise of an Aboriginal right to hunt.
 ii Macfarlane J.A. (Taggart J.A. and Wallace J.A. concurring) found no Aboriginal right but, in the 
alternative, if there were a right, the Crown had justified any infringement.
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failed to justify the infringement. These decisions, markedly different 
from earlier cases that had resulted in convictions, revealed the powerful 
influence of s. 35.69 It was becoming abundantly clear that the consti-
tutional entrenchment of Aboriginal rights would affect the province’s 
capacity to restrict and limit Native hunting. The Crown did not appeal 
either case to the scc.
 The fishing rights cases were more contentious. They put the question 
of an Aboriginal right to a commercial fishery squarely before the court, 
a question that the bcca and the scc had sidestepped in Sparrow. The 
lead case in what became known as the Van der Peet trilogy involved 
charges against Dorothy Van der Peet, a member of the Stó:lō Nation of 
the lower Fraser River, for selling two salmon that had been caught under 
a food fishing licence. Justice Macfarlane, with whom Justice Taggart 
concurred, defined the case this way: “it is about an asserted Indian right 
to sell fish allocated for food purposes on a commercial basis.”70 Similarly, 
Justice Wallace asked whether the Stó:lō had an Aboriginal right “to sell 
fish caught pursuant to a Food Fish licence?”71 Framed in these terms, 
the court held that the Stó:lō had failed to establish an Aboriginal right 
to sell fish caught for food purposes.72 It reached a similar conclusion in 
Gladstone (Justice Macfarlane for the majority) and N.T.C. Smokehouse 
(Justice Wallace for the majority, Justice Hutcheon concurring). 
 Justice Lambert was the sole dissenting voice that would have acquitted 
the accused in each of the commercial fishing rights cases. Instead of 
defining the claimed right in terms of the extent to which the activity that 
gave rise to the charges deviated from the regulations (i.e., a right to sell 
fish caught under a food fish licence), Justice Lambert characterized the 
right as follows: “If the fishing for salmon was what defined the culture 
of the society and made possible the cycle of the lives of its members, 
then it would be possible to describe the aboriginal right as a right to live 
from the salmon resource and to continue to make the salmon a focus of 
 69 The earlier cases include R. v. Kruger, [1975] 5 W.W.R. 167, 9 C.N.L.C. 620 (B.C.C.A.); R. 
v. Haines, [1981] 6 W.W.R. 664, [1982] 2 C.N.L.R. 135 (B.C.C.A.); and R. v. Dick, (1982) 145 
D.L.R. (3d), [1983] 2 C.N.L.R. 134 (B.C.C.A.). Although, see Justice Lambert in dissent in 
Dick (1982).
 70 Van der Peet (B.C.C.A.) at para. 30.
 71 Ibid. at para. 79.
 72 Andrea Bowker notes the degree to which the existing regulatory structure framed the 
characterization of the right. That is, the right is articulated in terms of the degree to which 
Aboriginal fishers are constrained by or free from the existing regulations creating a food 
fishery. Macfarlane J.A., she argues, “reads the regulation into the right.” See Andrea Bowker, 
“Sparrow’s Promise: Aboriginal Rights in the B.C. Court of Appeal,” University of Toronto 
Faculty of Law Review 53 (1995): 1-48 at 24.
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the sustainment of the lives of the people.”73 This was a characterization, 
he claimed, that was “sensitive to the aboriginal perspective,” something 
that the scc had prescribed in Sparrow.74 Justice Lambert then turned to a 
series of US cases, primarily treaty fishing rights cases from Washington 
State, for the proposition that the Aboriginal right to fish extended to 
such fishing as was necessary to support a moderate livelihood.75 The 
right, he concluded, extended to “self-regulation” of the fishery and to 
a catch of “sufficient salmon to provide all the people who wish to be 
personally engaged in the fishery, and their dependent families, when 
coupled with other financial resources, with a moderate livelihood.”76 He 
would extend this analysis to the Heiltsuk herring fishery in Gladstone 
and the Sheshaht and Opetchesaht salmon fishery in N.T.C. Smokehouse, 
acquitting the accused in each case.
 The defendants appealed their convictions to the scc, which in turn 
upheld the convictions in every case except Gladstone; William and 
Donald Gladstone had established an Aboriginal right to a commercial 
fishery. Following Justice Hutcheon’s approach in the bcca in Van der 
Peet, the scc sent the Crown and the Gladstones back to the trial court 
to hear more evidence on the Crown’s objectives in regulating the fishery 
and whether the regulatory scheme for the herring fishery was a justi-
fiable infringement of that right.77 However, Justice McLachlin on the 
scc would adopt Lambert’s characterization of the right as conferring a 
moderate livelihood, and, several years later, the scc would embed it in 
the framework for the interpretation of historic treaty rights to fish in 
R. v. Marshall.78 This, perhaps, marks the signal contribution from the 
bcca to the emerging understanding of s. 35 in the hunting and fishing 
rights cases.
 73 Van der Peet (B.C.C.A.) at para. 137.
 74 Ibid. at para. 132.
 75 For an analysis of the links between the US cases and the development of Aboriginal and 
treaty rights jurisprudence in Canada, see Douglas C. Harris, “The Boldt Decision in Canada: 
Aboriginal Treaty Rights to Fish on the Pacific,” in Alexandra Harmon, ed., The Power of 
Promises: Indian Treaties in the Pacific Northwest (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
2008) 128-53.
 76 Van der Peet (B.C.C.A.) at para. 150. Lambert J.A. went on to indicate that this right to a 
moderate livelihood for individuals and their families participating in the salmon fishery 
would amount to “not less than the quantity of salmon needed to provide every one of the 
collective holders of the aboriginal right with the same amount of salmon per person per 
year as would have been consumed or otherwise utilized by each of the collective holders of 
the right, on average, from a comparable year’s salmon run, in, say, 1800.” See the critique of 
the moderate livelihood standard from Wallace J.A. at para. 103.
 77 R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723, [1996] 4 C.N.L.R. 65.
 78 R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533, [1999] 4 C.N.L.R. 301.
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 In Delgamuukw, the bcca had before it the controversy generated by 
the decision of Chief Justice McEachern in the trial court. It was also 
presented with a somewhat different case. At trial, the chief justice had 
dismissed the claim of the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en chiefs to ownership 
and jurisdiction over their traditional territory, finding instead that the 
plaintiffs held rights to their villages and non-exclusive Aboriginal rights 
to use adjacent land for sustenance and ceremony but that these rights 
had been extinguished by pre-Confederation colonial enactments – the 
same thirteen land acts and ordinances that had been much debated in 
Calder. In short, the colony had effected a “blanket extinguishment” 
of Aboriginal title with its land legislation. However, a change in 
the provincial government between trial and appeal brought about a 
change in the province’s position. Instead of “blanket extinguishment,” 
the province conceded that the plaintiffs held Aboriginal rights in the 
claimed territory, or parts of it, but that these rights had been impaired or 
infringed in some areas. Nonetheless, the basic issues of ownership and 
jurisdiction, sometimes referred to in the bcca decision as Aboriginal 
title and self-government, remained.79
 All five justices agreed that the province had been right to concede 
its claim of “blanket extinguishment”: the colonial legislation had not 
extinguished Aboriginal rights, and subsequent provincial legislation 
could not. However, they disagreed on the extent of those rights. Justice 
Macfarlane found that the plaintiffs had “unextinguished non-exclusive 
aboriginal rights, other than a right of ownership or a property right.”80 
In a concurring decision, Justice Wallace found “a non-exclusive ab-
original right of traditional occupation.”81 They did not delineate the 
content of the Aboriginal right, but it was less than a property interest 
and they dismissed the plaintiffs claim to ownership. Similarly, both 
justices concluded that whatever jurisdiction the plaintiffs might retain, 
it could not impinge on federal or provincial power as divided under the 
Constitution.82 Aside from the question of “blanket extinguishment,” 
which the province had conceded before the appeal, the bcca upheld 
the lower court’s decision.
 Justice Lambert’s decision was substantially different. Inclined to search 
broadly for guidance (the archives in Bartleman, the US Supreme Court 
 79 At the scc the plaintiffs would alter their pleadings to frame the case explicitly in terms of 
Aboriginal title and self-government, a change that formed one of the grounds on which the 
scc would send the matter back to trial. 
 80 Delgamuukw (B.C.C.A.) at para. 293.
 81 Ibid. at para. 519.
 82 Ibid. at paras. 171, 484. See the critique in Bruce Ryder, “Aboriginal Rights and Delgamuukw 
v. The Queen,” Constitutional Forum 5 (1994): 43-48.
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in the Van der Peet trilogy), in Delgamuukw Justice Lambert turned to 
the recent decision of the Australian High Court in Mabo v. Queensland 
and its ruling that “native title” was an entitlement “as against the whole 
world to possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the lands.”83 It 
was, in short, a property interest. Adopting this interpretation, Justice 
Lambert ruled that the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en held “exclusive” or 
“shared-exclusive” Aboriginal title over the lands they had occupied 
exclusively or in combination with other Aboriginal peoples when the 
British asserted sovereignty in 1846.84 They also held “a right to harvest, 
manage and conserve the lands and their resources” as well as “a right 
to maintain and develop their institutions for the regulation of their 
aboriginal title” – that is, a right of self-government or self-regulation.85 
The plaintiffs and the province were to negotiate the precise boundaries 
of Aboriginal title land and the division of jurisdiction that would ac-
company self-government, but failing successful negotiations, either 
party could return to court, and Justice Lambert sent the case back to 
trial. Justice Hutcheon concurred, and so, four years and an unsuccessful 
round of negotiations later, would the scc.86 Canada’s highest court 
deferred the question of self-government but held that Aboriginal title 
was an interest in land, one that was based on exclusive possession in 1846 
and that amounted to exclusive possession in contemporary Canada.
ABORIGINAL LAW AND PRACTICE
Aboriginal peoples and occasionally the Crown have turned to the 
courts to help structure the processes of litigation and negotiation 
over Aboriginal rights and title, and here perhaps the bcca has had 
its greatest influence in recent years. It has ruled on the relationship 
between Aboriginal title and the title registration system, and on the 
duty of the Crown to consult Aboriginal peoples where Aboriginal 
title is claimed but not yet proven. It has also established guidelines 
regarding when a claim to Aboriginal title can be litigated and the 
circumstances in which the Crown is obliged to support the litigation 
costs of an Aboriginal plaintiff or defendant.
 83 Ibid. at paras. 912-914. Lambert J.A. citing Mabo v. Queensland (1992) 107 A.L.R. 1 (Aust. 
H.C.).
 84 Ibid. at paras. 1008-1010, 1074.
 85 Ibid., at para. 1078. See also Bob Freedman, “The Space for Aboriginal Self-Government in 
British Columbia: The Effect of the Decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in 
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,” UBC Law Review 28 (1994): 49.
 86 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, [1998] 1 C.N.L.R. 14.
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 In separate decisions, the first involving a preliminary motion in 
Delgamuukw,87 the other a dispute over a proposed development near 
Kamloops,88 the bcaa disallowed the attempts of Aboriginal plaintiffs 
to register a certificate of pending litigation in the land title system 
against fee simple interests on land to which they claimed Aboriginal 
title. If they had been successful, the effect of registering a certificate of 
pending litigation would have been to freeze further transfers of the fee 
simple interest until the resolution of the Aboriginal title claim. However, 
Justice Southin ruled in Skeetchestn that the province had never intended 
Aboriginal title to be a registerable interest when it created the title 
registration system and, therefore, that private interests in land would 
remain unencumbered by a claim to Aboriginal title. 
 In 2002, as the BC Treaty Process laboured without results, Aboriginal 
title litigation seemed interminable, and the provincial government 
continued to act as though a claim to Aboriginal title presented little or 
no burden on the Crown’s title, Justices Rowles and Huddart determined 
that the province had a duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples before 
authorizing a project, in this case a mine, that could adversely affect 
their interests.89 Less than a month later, a unanimous three-panel bench 
of the bcca led by Justice Lambert ruled in Haida Nation v. British 
Columbia (Minister of Forests) that the Crown and a large multinational 
logging company had a duty to consult and to accommodate Aboriginal 
peoples in circumstances where the Crown permitted and the company 
undertook activity that could infringe Aboriginal title should that title 
ever be established.90 In other words, the duty to consult and accom-
modate extended to land where title was claimed but not proven. The scc 
would pull back a little on these decisions, overturning the decision in 
Taku River Tlingit on the basis that there had been adequate consultation 
and, in Haida Nation, restricting the duty to consult and accommodate 
to the Crown.91 Nonetheless, the bcca had fundamentally reshaped 
the legal landscape in a province where virtually all land not included 
within a treaty is subject to a claim of Aboriginal title. In effect, the 
court had pronounced that Aboriginal peoples were to be a part of any 
future development within their territory, and the scc concurred.
 87 Delgamuukw (Uukw) v. British Columbia, [1987] 6 W.W.R. 240, 16 B.C.L.R. (2d) 145 
(B.C.C.A.).
 88 Skeetchestn Indian Band v. British Columbia (Register of Land Titles), 2000 bcca 525.
 89 Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. Ringstad, 2002 bcca 59. Justice Southin was in dissent.
 90 Haida Nation (B.C.C.A.).
 91 Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), 2004 scc 
74; Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 scc 73.
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 Finally, two decisions from Justice Newbury in 2000 and 2001 have the 
potential to determine the shape of future Aboriginal rights litigation. 
In Cheslatta Carrier Nation v. British Columbia the plaintiffs sought a 
declaration that they had an Aboriginal right to fish. The chambers 
judge dismissed the motion for failing to disclose a cause of action, 
and Justice Newbury, writing for a three-panel bench on the Court of 
Appeal, agreed. The issue of Aboriginal rights should only be litigated, 
she held, where there was a “live controversy” or a dispute to be resolved; 
the court would not consider a motion for a declaration in the absence of 
a dispute.92 The full effect of this judgment is yet to be felt, but it is likely 
to confirm the existing pattern that Aboriginal rights claims appear most 
commonly in court in response to the prosecution of a regulatory offence, 
usually relating to hunting or fishing, where there is clearly a “real dif-
ficulty” for the court to resolve.93 Conversely, a civil lawsuit to establish 
Aboriginal rights has become more difficult. However, if Cheslatta made 
it more difficult for Aboriginal litigants to get to court, one year later, in 
another unanimous decision authored by Justice Newbury, the court ruled 
that the Aboriginal litigants in British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. 
Okanagan Indian Band were entitled to costs in advance of the decision 
on the merits.94 The dispute involved the applicability of the provincial 
Forest Practices Code on land to which the Okanagan claimed Aboriginal 
title, a dispute of considerable public interest involving “exceptional or 
unique circumstances,” wrote Justice Newbury, that the Okanagan were 
otherwise unable to fund.95 Within a month of this decision and citing it 
in support, the British Columbia Supreme Court made an interim costs 
order to require that the Crown help the Tsilhquot’in to fund their land 
claims litigation.96 The scc would confirm these orders when it upheld 
the bcca’s decision in Okanagan,97 and since then other First Nations 
have successfully secured similar arrangements.98
 92 Cheslatta Carrier Nation v. British Columbia, 2000 bcca 539 at paras. 16-18.
 93 Ibid. at para. 17. For an early example of the effect of this ruling see Nemaiah Valley Indian 
Band v. Riverside Forest Products Ltd., 2003 bcsc 249.
 94 British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band, 2001 bcca 647.
 95 Ibid. at para. 39.
 96 Xeni Gwet’ in First Nations v. British Columbia, 2001 bcsc 1641.
 97 British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band, 2003 scc 71.
 98 Hagwiliget Indian Band v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs), 2008 FC 574. Although see the 
subsequent decision in British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band, 2008 
bcca 107, to sever the Aboriginal title component of the case, thereby greatly reducing the 
importance of the costs order.
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A COURT BETWEEN
Provincial courts of appeal sit between trial courts, which produce the 
evidentiary record, and the scc, the court of final appeal. From this 
middle perch, they oversee the trial courts but, in turn, are overseen 
by the Supreme Court. They supervise but are subject to supervision, 
and their capacity to supervise is determined, in part, by the degree 
to which they are supervised. If the statements of provincial courts 
of appeal are frequently countermanded or simply reconsidered, even 
if not altered, their capacity to shape the development of the law 
diminishes. Conversely, if the oversight is infrequent, the statements of 
the provincial courts of appeal assume greater importance. In his study 
of the relationship between the Supreme Court and provincial courts of 
appeal, Peter McCormick suggests that “each Supreme Court decision 
is a message that it is trying to send down the hierarchy to the ultimate 
consumers, the trial courts and the parties that appear before them, 
and the appeal process is the way that the Supreme Court oversees the 
transmission of this message, reinforcing or fine-tuning it on subsequent 
occasions.”99 The more the scc intervenes the more it diminishes the 
importance of the provincial courts of appeal, which play the same role 
as the scc but lower in the court hierarchy.
 The scc’s readiness to grant requests for leave to appeal is one measure 
of its willingness to intervene. By that measure, the scc has been excep-
tionally interventionist in Aboriginal law cases emerging from British 
Columbia. Table 2 lists by decade the number of bcca decisions in the 
Canadian Native Law Reporter (cnlr) since it began reporting in 1979, 
the number of requests for leave to appeal that emerged from those cases, 
and the number of times the Supreme Court granted leave. Of the 115 
decisions from the bcca in the cnlr over this period, one or more of 
the parties sought leave to appeal in 52 (45 percent) of them. Of these 52 
applications, the scc granted leave in 28 (54 percent). The percentages 
are somewhat higher in the middle decade, the ten years when s. 35 
litigation first appeared in the scc, and somewhat lower in the decade 
just concluded. But all the numbers are high when compared against 
the general success rate of applications for leave to appeal from British 
Columbia (21 percent) and from the country as a whole (16 percent) over 
approximately the same period.100 Before 1979, leave was sought and the 
 99 Peter McCormick, “The Supervisory Role of the Supreme Court of Canada: An Analysis 
of Appeals from Provincial Courts of Appeal, 1949-1990,” Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 3 
(1992): 1-28 at 28. 
 100 The two sets of data do not correspond exactly. The C.N.L.R., source for bcca decisions in 
the area of Aboriginal law, begins reporting in 1979. The Supreme Court Law Review reporting 
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scc granted leave in almost every Aboriginal and treaty rights case 
heard in the bcca.101
 These figures suggest that the scc’s oversight of the bcca is sig-
nificantly greater in the area of Aboriginal law than in other areas 
of the law. This may not be unique to British Columbia; the success 
rate for leave to appeal from other provincial courts of appeal may be 
similarly high in Aboriginal law cases. However, as a large number of 
the most important cases have emerged from British Columbia, the 
scc appears to have been particularly active in its review of decisions 
from that province. The constitutional entrenchment of Aboriginal 
and treaty rights probably explains much of the scc’s involvement. This 
on the rate at which the scc grants leaves to appeal begins in 1981-82. See the notes to Table 1 
for details of the sources and differences.
 101 The scc granted leave in White and Bob (1965), Calder (1973), R. v. Derriksan (1976), R. v. Kruger 
and Manuel (1977), and R. v. Jack (1979).
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rate of all leave  







1979-1988 33 12 6 50 n/a 21
1989-1998 45 20 12 60 23 16
1999-2008 38 20 10 50 19 12
Total 116 52 28 54 21 16
 i Average success rates for leave to appeal applications are derived from statistics produced annually in 
the Supreme Court Law Review. The first set appears in S.I. Bushnell, “Leave to Appeal Applications: 
The 1984-85 Term,” Supreme Court Law Review 8 (1986): 383, and includes rates at which the scc granted 
leave back to the 1981-82 term. The scc defines a term as 1 September to 31 August. The Supreme Court 
Law Review includes rates at which the scc grants leaves to appeal by province beginning in the 1988-89 
term. Because of these differences, the line for 1979-88 indicates the rate at which the scc granted leaves 
to appeal from 1981-82 to 1987-88; the line for 1989-1998 indicates the rate from 1988-89 to 1998-99; and the 
line for 1999-2008 indicates the rate from 1998-99 to 2007-08.
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fundamental reshaping of the legal terrain required direction from 
the country’s highest court. But that explanation does not account for 
the scc’s oversight before 1982, and it probably does not explain all of 
it afterwards.
 When Aboriginal and treaty rights re-emerged in the 1960s and 1970s 
from Indian Act-imposed exile, they did so tentatively and gradually 
as judges struggled to understand rights that had not been articulated 
in Canadian courtrooms for half a century. In these early years, as 
Aboriginal and treaty rights cases came sporadically and then with 
increasing frequency before the bcca, the court declined to engage 
with the substance of the claims. With the exception of White and Bob, 
where the court infused agreements between Aboriginal peoples on 
Vancouver Island and the hbc with treaty status, Aboriginal peoples 
did not find a hospitable reception for their claims in BC courtrooms. 
The bcca’s dismissal of the Nisga’a claim to Aboriginal title in Calder 
was more representative of the court’s work as well as of the views of the 
larger society. Successive provincial governments denied the existence 
or relevance of Aboriginal title in Canada’s westernmost province.
 However, the scc’s decision in Calder set the country on another track, 
one that led, in 1982, to the constitutional entrenchment of Aboriginal 
and treaty rights – “the riveting of these provisions within Canada’s legal 
framework.”102 This heightened the prominence of Aboriginal and treaty 
rights, and elevated the role of the courts as arbiters between Aboriginal 
peoples and the Canadian state. Attempts to assert Aboriginal rights no 
longer had to be dressed in the garb of federalism and the jurisdictional 
straying of provincial governments. Instead, claims of Aboriginal title, 
of rights to fish and hunt, and of self-government could be put directly 
to the courts, and treaty rights were taken more seriously in light of their 
newly acquired constitutional status.
 When these claims reached the bcca in the mid 1980s, they en-
countered a court now prepared to listen. In a remarkable series of de-
cisions, including Bartleman and Saanichton Marina on treaty rights, the 
Meares Island case on Aboriginal title, and Sparrow on fishing rights, 
the court put itself at the forefront of an extraordinary transformation in 
Canadian law. At a national level these decisions helped to establish the 
foundation on which constitutional rights would be interpreted. Within 
the province, they pushed the provincial government to admit, in 1990, 
 102 John Borrows, “Uncertain Citizens: Aboriginal Peoples and The Supreme Court,” Canadian 
Bar Review 80 (2001): 15-41 at 18.
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that it had a responsibility to join the federal government in negotiations 
with Aboriginal peoples over the unresolved issue of Aboriginal title.
 With this period of initial activism behind it and the British Columbia 
Treaty Process underway, the court issued a much more ambiguous set 
of rulings in 1993. A divided court would provide limited recognition of 
Aboriginal rights and a constrained understanding of Aboriginal title. 
In the same series of cases the scc would establish the basic frameworks 
in which Aboriginal rights and title were to be determined. In this 
process, the bcca contributed relatively little. However, the tide turned 
again in the early twenty-first century when the court delivered a series 
of influential albeit mixed decisions that, while not ruling directly on 
an Aboriginal rights or title claim, structure the way in which those 
claims are litigated or negotiated.
 Justice Lambert deserves particular mention. His twenty-five years 
on the bcca spanned the turbulent decades following the constitutional 
entrenchment of Aboriginal and treaty rights, and he, more than any 
other judge on the court, was at the centre of this rapidly developing area 
of law. Writing for or with the majority in the 1980s, offering a strongly 
dissenting voice in the 1990s, and then frequently with the majority in 
his last few years on the court, Justice Lambert authored a remarkable 
body of jurisprudence.103 Sometimes the scc reined in his rulings, as in 
Haida Nation by limiting the duty to consult and accommodate to the 
Crown, but more often than not it confirmed his basic approach. No 
other BC judge exceeds his contribution to the emerging understanding 
of Aboriginal and treaty rights in Canada.
 In its engagement with Aboriginal and treaty rights, the record of 
the bcca is as mixed as that of the larger society, which struggles to 
live justly in a place settled by one group of peoples and then resettled 
by others. The scc has been an active intervener, certainly, because of 
the constitutional entrenchment of Aboriginal and treaty rights, but 
perhaps also out of a sense, particularly in the early years when Abo-
riginal peoples and their legal counsel began returning to the courts, 
that Aboriginal rights and title had not always had their due in British 
Columbia. The federal government had long disputed the province’s 
refusal to recognize Aboriginal title, and perhaps the difference of 
opinion in political circles informed judicial approaches as well. Much 
has changed in the province and in its highest court, even as the 
 103 Louise Mandel, who appeared many times before Justice Lambert, counted twenty-three 
Aboriginal law judgments from Justice Lambert. See “Honouring a Brave Jurist: The Lambert 
Tribute,” The Advocate 64 (2006): 207-16.
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efforts to co-exist in a shared territory continue. Sometimes maligned, 
sometimes lauded, the Court of Appeal’s contributions in the field of 
Aboriginal law are varied but undeniable, and, given the struggle that 
continues in British Columbia over the recognition of rights and title, 
the institution will almost certainly continue to play a central role, 
from its middle perch in the court system, in the unfolding relationship 
between Aboriginal peoples and the Canadian state. In this sense as 
well, the British Columbia Court of Appeal is, or must aspire to be, a 
court between.
